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What Is An Action For Purposes Of
California Civil Procedure Code Section
726?
In the 1984 case, Bank of America v. Daily,1 the California Court
of Appeal held that a bank's setoff was an action for purposes of
California Civil Procedure Code section 726 (the one action rule).
The bank lost over $170,000 in security due to this $10,000. Cali-
fornia courts have circumvented the policies behind section 726 by
interpreting the one action rule expansively. This Comment argues
that debtor protection is not achieved through inequitable creditor
remedies and that legislative reform is necessary to achieve the
protection that section 726 intended to provide California debtors.
I. INTRODUCTION
A debtor owed a bank $340,000 as evidenced by a note secured by
common stock and a deed of trust on real property. When the debtor
defaulted on the note, the bank sold the stock, setoff $10,412.50
from a checking account which the debtor held with the bank, and
then initiated a judicial foreclosure sale under the deed of trust to
collect the remaining balance.' The California court of appeal held
that the bank's setoff was an action4 for recovery of a debt within
the meaning of California Civil Procedure Code section 7265 (one
1. 152 Cal. App. 3d 767, 199 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1984).
2. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
3. Bank of America v. Daily, 152 Cal. App. 3d 767, 770, 199 Cal. Rptr. 557,
558 (1984).
4. The term "action" hereinafter refers to an action for purposes of California
Civil Procedure Code section 726, otherwise known as the "one action rule."
5. Daily, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 772-73, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 559-60. The California
Code of Civil Procedure discusses the one action rule in section 726:
There can be but one form of action for the recovery of any debt, or the en-
forcement of any right secured by mortgage upon real property, which action
must be in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. In such action the
court may, by its judgment, direct the sale of the encumbered property (or so
much thereof as may be necessary), and the application of the proceeds of the
sale to the payment of the costs of court, and the expenses of the sale, and the
amount due plaintiff, including, where the mortgage provides for the payment
of attorney's fees, such sum for such fees as the court shall find reasonable, not
exceeding the amount named in the mortgage.
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action rule), and that the bank waived its right to judicial foreclo-
sure. Thus, the bank lost approximately $170,000 of remaining se-
curity on a note due to a $10,000 setoff.
The one action rule was promulgated as an attempt to protect
debtor interests.' California courts have interpreted the one action
rule expansively, protecting the debtor and, at the same time, impos-
ing harsh sanctions on the creditor.7 This problem arises in part from
the nebulous definition of the term "action." Once a court decides
that certain conduct is an action, that single action constitutes the
creditor's sole source of relief, precluding additional recovery from
the debtor." Courts are thus unsure of application of section 726 and
are hesitant to qualify conduct as an action.9
Some commentators,10 argue that the term action should be con-
sistent with the definition of action within California Civil Procedure
Code section 22 which seems to contemplate only judicial proceed-
ings.1" But courts have interpreted an action for purpose of section
726 to include some non-judicial activities" and exclude some judi-
cial activities. 3 An action for purposes of section 726 should be
redefined to effectuate the policies behind the one action rule as well
as to allow creditor recovery.
This Comment will first discuss the historical background of deeds
of trust. Furthermore, the Comment will analyze and suggest solu-
tions for California's expansive interpretation of section 726. The
Comment will conclude that the definition of an action as stipulated
in section 22 should be read into section 726. Additionally, this
Comment will discuss the policy reasons which compel the creditor
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(a) (West 1980 & Supp. 1987) [hereinafter One-Action
Rule].
6. Pacific Valley Bank v. Schwenke, 189 Cal. App. 3d 134, 141-42, 234 Cal.
Rptr. 298, 302 (1987), (citing Salter v. Ulrich, 22 Cal. 2d 263, 266, 138 P.2d 7, 9
(1943)).
7. Arnold, Anti-Deficiency in the Eighties: The "Sanction Aspect," Fair Value
and Where the Action Is (And Isn't), 5 CAL. REAL PROP. J. Spring 1987, at i.
8. Daily, 152 Cal. App. 3d 767, 199 Cal. Rptr. 557. However, a deficiency judg-
ment may be recovered after a judicial foreclosure sale has failed to satisfy the debt.
Winkleman v. Sides, 31 Cal. App. 2d 387, 406, 88 P.2d 147, 156 (1939) (citing
Birkhofer v. Krumm, 4 Cal. App. 2d 43 , 40 P.2d 553 (1935)).
9. See, e.g., Schwenke, 189 Cal. App. 3d at 141-42, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 302. The
court of appeal held that the lender's unilateral divesture of collateral violated section
726. However, the court stated that this "release of security needn't be characterized as
an 'action'." Id.
10. See, e.g., Mertens, California's Foreclosure Statues: Some Proposals for Re-
form, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 533, 577-79 (1986); Arnold, supra note 7, at 10.
11. Section 22 states that an action is "an ordinary proceeding in a court of jus-
tice by which one party prosecutes another for the declaration, enforcement, or protec-
tion of a right, the redress or protection of a wrong, or the punishment of a public of-
fense." CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 22 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987). See also Arnold, supra
note 7, at 10.
12. See infra notes 83-104 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 105-113 and accompanying text.
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to foreclose on the secured property before reaching the debtor's
other assets. The remedy proposed by this Comment sanctions a
creditor who fails to first foreclose on the security by disallowing the
creditor to obtain a personal judgment on the underlying debt. In-
stead, the creditor would be forced to first foreclose on the security. 4
II. BACKGROUND-REAL ESTATE FINANCING DEVICES
Most real property purchases are financed. 15 Generally, the pur-
chaser borrows an amount in excess of the down payment from the
seller or a third party lender. The mortgage is the traditional secur-
ity instrument used in real estate secured transactions. However, in
California the deed of trust is the preferred security instrument. 16
The deed of trust is treated as a mortgage because it performs the
same economic function.' 7 The remaining differences between these
instruments are the number and designation of the parties', and the
statute of limitations period regarding the power of sale.' 9
Throughout its history, mortgage law attempted to reach equitable
results by balancing the interests of the mortgagor and mortgagee.
Nevertheless, courts, legislatures and legal draftsmen have not ac-
complished this goal. The creditor or debtor have each received
favorable treatment, depending upon which group's problems are
perceived as more pressing at the time.20
At early common law, title theory was in effect. Under this doc-
trine, title passed to the creditor. If the debtor did not pay the obli-
gation when due, a forfeiture took place.2' The debtor had no prop-
14. This "sanction" was raised but not imposed by the court. Daily, 152 Cal.
App. 3d at 772, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
15. Mertens, supra note 10, at 536-47.
16. A. PERRY, CALIFORNIA CASES AND MATERIALS ON SECURED LAND FINANC-
ING 11l (rev. 1984).
17. Bank of Italy Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Bentley, 217 Cal. 644, 657 20 P.2d
940, 945 (1933).
18. The parties to a mortgage are mortgagor (debtor or obligor) and mortgagee
(creditor or obligee) whereas the parties to a deed of trust are trustor (debtor or obligor),
beneficiary (creditor or obligee) and trustee (usually a bank or title insurance company,
or escrow company). For purposes of this Comment, the terms creditor, debtor and trus-
tee will be used to denote the above-mentioned parties. A. PERRY, supra note 16. The
trustee in a deed of trust retains the title and also has power to foreclose on the security.
See Bank of Italy, 217 Cal. at 655-656, 20 P.2d at 944-945.
19. The statute of limitations does not run against a deed of trust but does run
against a mortgage. Bank of Italy, 217 Cal. at 655, 20 P.2d at 944.
20. G. THOMPSON, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
693 (1958).
21. Bank of Italy, 217 Cal. at 654, 20 P.2d at 943.
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erty interest until he paid the debt in full.22 Later, equitable relief
was granted for those debtors who tendered the amount due on the
debt owed within a reasonable amount of time. 3 Although Califor-
nia initially adopted a lien theory 4 for mortgages whereby the credi-
tors obtain a lien only, it adopted a title theory in reference to deeds
of trust. 25 Today, both instruments have the same effect on titles.20 A
standard deed of trust includes a grant of property to a named trus-
tee in trust for the benefit of a named creditor, coupled with a trus-
tee's power of sale in the event of the debtor's default. 27 These trus-
tee sales are one kind of foreclosure sale.28 Although foreclosure
22. In 14th century England, the dominant form of a mortgage was the convey-
ance of the fee to the mortgagee upon the condition subsequent that if the mortgagor
paid in full, on or before the due date (law day), he regained his estate. The mortgagor
retained only a right of entry. No excuse existed for late payment. If the mortgagor
failed to perform then the title absolutely vested in the mortgagee and the mortgagor
irrevocably lost his land. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ I-
2, at 6-8 (1985).
23. At first, relief was granted based on a special showing of fraud or oppression.
By the end of the 17th century, equity courts routinely intervened and provided for equi-
table redemption. All mortgagors could redeem their land by tendering the amount due
within a reasonable time after law day.
By granting relief to mortgagors, equitable redemption created new problems for mort-
gagees. Mortgagees were uncertain as to when redemption might occur because the
mortgagor was permitted a reasonable time within which to redeem the property. Even-
tually, equity allowed mortgagees to petition for foreclosure and terminate the mortga-
gor's right to redeem the property. Common law transfer of title essentially left the mort-
gagor with a right of entry plus equitable protections. Even when the mortgagor
remained in possession, he had no legal estate in the land and he could be ejected by the
mortgagee, even prior to default. G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES §§ 5-8 at 9-17 (1970).
24. The lien theory evolved in recognition of the commercial nature of the mort-
gage and the unjust results which emanated from the title theory of mortgages. Under
the lien theory, the mortgagee only has a lien with the legal title held by the mortgagor.
See 3 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY ch. 37, 11 454.1[2] (1987).
25. Bank of Italy, 217 Cal. at 655, 201 P.2d at 944.
26. Id. at 657, 20 P.2d at 945.
27. A. PERRY, supra note 16, at 118.
28. Foreclosure by sale takes two forms. First, a judicial sale may be conducted
by an officer of the court. Alternatively, a power of sale may be conferred on the mortga-
gee by the mortgagor. Many states permitting mortgages to contain a power of sale
clause provide that the creditors may sell the property without a judicial proceeding. This
is referred to as a private sale.
The fundamentals are the same in both the judicial and private sale. The mortgaged
property is sold under certain safeguards to ensure fair conduct, and the proceeds are
used to pay the expenses of the proceedings and the claim of the creditor. Any surplus
goes to the debtor. If the proceeds are insufficient to pay the mortgage claim, the creditor
may obtain a judgment for the deficiency. See generally Washburn, The Judicial and
Legislative Response to Price Monopoly in Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, 53 S. CAL. L.
REV. 843, 844-51 (1980). California bars the creditor from obtaining a deficiency judg-
ment after a private sale (non-judicial foreclosure). CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 580(d)
(West 1976 & Supp. 1988). See also infra note 33 and accompanying text.
Hence, foreclosure by sale protects the debtor's equity in the property yet allows the
mortgagee to recover a deficiency judgment when proceeds of the sale are insufficient to
pay the mortgage debt. A judicial sale differs from a private sale in this respect. Theoret-
ically, a price equivalent to the property's market value is determined through the com-
petitive bidding process. Moreover, the court ensures that the sale is at a fair price. See
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sales theoretically assume a price equivalent to market value, such
sales have actually been ineffective in achieving this goal.2"
State legislatures responded to these problems by providing more
effective relief for mortgagors through the enactment of a wide vari-
ety of anti-deficiency laws.30 These laws protect debtors from fore-
closure sales at depressed prices and deficiency judgments measured
by those prices. 3' The California legislature enacted the fair value
provisions, 32 the anti-deficiency protection,33 and the one action
Washburn, at 846.
In California, fair value is achieved through procedures under the California Code of
Civil Procedure. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 580(a)(West 1976 and Supp. 1988) and CAL.
Civ. PROC. CODE § 726(b)(West 1980 & Supp. 1988) (fair value provisions). See also
infra note 32 and accompanying text.
29. The economic depression of the 1930's emphasized the public's willingness to
pay only bargain prices at foreclosure sales. Properties regularly sold for nominal
amounts at foreclosure sales. Furthermore, the creditor could purchase the property at a
sub-market price and simultaneously obtain a deficiency judgement for the difference
between the price the property sold for and the amount of the mortgage debt. The result
was double recovery for the creditor and a double burden to the debtor who had to lose
the property and pay a deficiency judgment. See generally Washburn, supra note 28, at
843-50; see also G. OSBORNE, supra note 23, at 702.
30. G. OSBORNE, supra note 23, § 335, at 702-05.
31. Id.
32. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 580(a) requiring a fair value hearing and limitation,
provides in pertinent part:
The court may render judgment for not more than the amount by which the
entire amount of the indebtedness due at the time of sale exceeded the fair
market value of the real property or interest therein sold at the time of sale
with interest thereon from the date of the sale; provided, however, that in no
event shall the amount of said judgment, exclusive of interest after the date of
sale, exceed the difference between the amount for which the property was sold
and the entire amount of the indebtedness secured by said deed of trust or
mortgage.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 580(a) (West 1976 & Supp. 1988).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(b) limits a deficiency judgment to: "... the amount of
the indebtedness . . . exceeds the fair value of the property . . . as of the date of sale. In
no event shall the amount of the judgment . . . exceed the difference between the
amount for which the property was sold and the entire amount of the indebtedness
." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 726(b) (West 1980 & Supp. 1988).
Sections 580(a) and 726(b) limit the size of the deficiency judgment to either (1) the
difference between the unpaid debt and the fair value of the security, or (2) the differ-
ence between the debt and the sale price of the security, whichever is smaller. The one
action rule, the focus of this Comment, precludes the creditor from avoiding the restric-
tions of the fair value provisions. Without section 726, the creditor could merely file an
action on the note, obtain a personal judgment, and then foreclose on the secured prop-
erty. However, because the one action rule forces secured creditors to foreclose, the rule
also forces them into a fair value hearing whenever they seek more than the value of
their security. See generally R. BERNHARDT, CALIFORNIA MORTGAGE AND DEED OF
TRUST PRACTICE §§ 4.15-4.19, (1979 & Supp. June 1987).
33. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(d) provides:
No judgment shall be rendered for any deficiency upon a note secured by a
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rule34 to regulate creditor remedies. However, the statutes are not
part of any comprehensive plan.3 5 Meanwhile, the courts have filled
the legislative gaps, often interpreting these statutes in ways which
are contrary to their intended purposes.
III. CALIFORNIA'S ONE ACTION RULE
A. History of the One Action Rule
The one action rule36 embodies the central axiom of the real prop-
erty system in the state of California. The policies and philosophy
of real property provisions are most readily discernible from this sec-
tion. 8 The one action rule begins: "There can be but one form of
action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of any right
secured by a mortgage upon real property." 39 This section is contro-
deed of trust or mortgage upon real property hereafter executed in any case in
which the real property has been sold by the mortgagee or trustee under power
of sale contained in such mortgage or deed of trust.
The provisions of this section shall not apply to any deed of trust, mortgage
or other lien given to secure the payment of bonds or other evidences of indebt-
edness authorized or permitted to be issued by the Commissioner of Corpora-
tions, or which is made by a public utility subject to the provisions of the Pub-
lic Utilities Act.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 580(d) (West 1976 & Supp. 1988).
This section imposes a complete bar against any deficiency judgment when the creditor
has elected to foreclose by power of sale rather than judicially. If the foreclosure sale
proceeds, there is no further recovery. See R. BERNHARDT, supra note 32 §§ 4.13-4.15.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 580(b) states:
No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after any sale of real property for
failure of the purchaser to complete his contract of sale, or under a deed of
trust, or mortgage, given to the vendor to secure payment of the balance of the
purchase price of real property, or under a deed of trust, or mortgage, on a
dwelling for not more than four families given to a lender to secure repayment
of a loan which was in fact used to pay all or part of the purchase price of such
dwelling occupied, entirely or in part, by the purchaser.
Where both a chattel mortgage and a deed of trust or mortgage have been
given to secure payment of the balance of the combined purchase price of both
real and personal property, no deficiency judgment shall lie at any time under
any one thereof if no deficiency judgment would lie under the deed of trust or
mortgage on real property.
CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(b) (West 1976 & Supp. 1988).
The basic rule of section 580(b) precludes deficiency judgments when purchase money
security is involved (money loaned by the seller to the purchaser, or if loaned by a third
party, money used to pay all or part of the purchase price of a dwelling of not more than
four units occupied entirely or in part by the purchaser). See R. BERNHARDT, supra note
32, at §§ 4.20-4.23.
34. See One Action Rule, supra note 5.
35. See R. BERNHARDT, supra note 32, at § 4.1.
36. See One Action Rule, supra note 5.
37. Hetland & Hansen, The "Mixed Collateral" Amendments to California's
Commercial Code - Covert Repeal of California's Real Property Foreclosure and An-
tideficiency Provisions or Exercise in Futility?, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 185, 199 (1987).
38. Id.
39. See One Action Rule, supra note 5.
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versial and provides the greatest potential for harm to a creditor.40
The one action rule traces its roots to the proposed New York
Code of Civil Procedure of 1850.4 1 This provision was never specifi-
cally enacted in California but was incorporated into section 246 of
the Civil Practice Act through an 1860 amendment.4 2 The proposed
New York code section never became law in that state nor in any
other state deriving their laws from the New York Civil Code.4" The
one action rule exists in several states today.44 However, the rule in
these states is patterned after California law rather than that of
New York.45 California's one action rule has not changed materially
in the one hundred years it has been in force,46 even though a 1933
amendment to section 726 changed the first sentence from one action
to one form of action.47
B. Purpose and Effect of the One Action Rule
Much of the confusion regarding the one action rule may be
ascribed to the failure of the courts to distinguish between its pur-
pose and its effect. The one action rule appears to have been adopted
with the purpose of avoiding multiple actions against a debtor. 48 The
express purpose of section 905 of the New York Code of Civil Proce-
dure of 1850, from which section 726 originated, was to prevent a
multiplicity of actions arising under common law.49
40. Bank of America v. Daily, 152 Cal. App. 3d 767, 199 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1984)
(if the creditor chooses to foreclose or setoff property and the court views this activity as
an action, the creditor is precluded from further recovery, whether the action satisfies the
debt or not). See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
41. Comment, Mortgages and Trust Deeds: Enforcement of a Secured Debt in
California, 31 CALIF. L. REV. 429, 430 (1943).
42. Id. at 429.
43. Id. at 430.
44. IDAHO CODE § 6-101 (1979 & Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-222
(1987); N.J. STAT. § 2A:50-2 (1952 & Supp. 1987); NEy. REV. STAT. § 40.430 (1986);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-37-1 (1987).
45. See Comment, supra note 41, at 430.
46. See Comment, Mortgages and Trust Deeds: Foreclosure Sale of a Portion of
the Mortgaged Premises: Remedies Open to the Mortgagee When the Security is Value-
less: Pleading the Existence of Security, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 469, 470 (1937).
47. Id.
48. Bank of Italy Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Bentley, 217 Cal. 644, 20 P.2d 940
(1933); Felton v. West, 102 Cal. 266, 36 P. 676 (1894); Ould v. Stoddard, 54 Cal. 613
(1880).
49. At common law the creditor had a choice of three actions which he could
bring against the debtor in case of debtor default. The creditor could sue on the note,
foreclose the mortgage, or bring an action of ejectment. These actions could be brought
separately or concurrently. See Comment, supra note 41, at 430 n.8. The proposed New
York Civil Code of 1850 allowed the creditor to sue on the underlying note or on the
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By contrast, California and other states5" enacting California's one
action rule require the creditor to foreclose on the secured property
before undertaking any other method of recovering on the debt.5 A
creditor may only recover from a debtor's personal estate by first
foreclosing on the property and then recovering a deficiency judg-
ment for the difference between the amount due on the note and the
proceeds from the sale of the property. 52 Effectively, the security be-
comes the primary fund from which the debt is satisfied. The secur-
ity must be exhausted before the creditor recovers on the underlying
obligation. Thus, section 726 is a security first rule, as well as a one
action rule.53
The courts have considered the effect of the statute as an expres-
sion of legislative purpose and policy, and as a consequence, it has
become a settled rule of judicial construction in California that
where a debt is secured by real property the security must first be
exhausted.54 A California debtor is not unconditionally promising to
pay on the underlying note. Instead, the trustor is promising to
render the secured property to the creditor in case of default, and
then pay to the creditor any deficiency judgment remaining after the
sale of the encumbered property.55
Multiplicity of suits is avoided under the choice of remedies doc-
trine of the proposed New York Code as well as the security first
principle of California's one action rule. However, the legislative his-
tory behind the enactment of the one action rule signifies the legisla-
ture's concern for the debtor's inability to bargain effectively for his
or her rights in a loan transaction, and to prevent the sale of real
property security at below market prices.5 6 Additionally, if the credi-
tor secures real property for the underlying note, this security should
be exhausted so that the debtor is not burdened even further when
security, but the mortgagee was precluded from recovery under both. Thus, the New
York one action principle would have limited the mortgagor to one remedy of his choice.
See R. BERNHARDT, supra note 32, at § 4.3.
50. See statutes cited supra note 44.
51. Winklemen v. Sides, 31 Cal. App. 2d 387, 88 P.2d 147 (1939); Porter v.
Muller, 65 Cal. 512, 4 P. 531 (1884); Jeppesen v. Rexburg State Bank, 57 Idaho 94, 99,
62 P.2d 1369, 1371 (1936); Thirteenth Ave., Ltd. v. De Marco, 44 N.J. 525, 529, 210
A.2d 401, 403 (1965); Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 581 P.2d 1001 (Utah 1978); Boucofski
v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117 (1909); Jensen v. Lichtensen, 45 Utah 320, 145 P.
1036 (1915).
52. Id.
53. See R. BERNHARDT supra note 32, at § 4.3.
54. See Comment, supra note 41, at 431.
55. Otto v. Long, 127 Cal. 471, 59 P. 895 (1900); Commercial Bank v. Kershner,
120 Cal. 495, 52 P. 848 (1898).
56. Walker v. Community Bank, 10 Cal. 3d 729, 518 P.2d 329, 111 Cal. Rptr.
897 (1974) (Section 726 was intended to prevent a multiplicity of actions, to compel
exhaustion of all security before entry of a deficiency judgment, and to require the debtor
to be credited with the fair market value of the secured property before being subjected
to personal liability).
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experiencing financial hardship.57 These policies are not effectuated
by the choice of remedies doctrine because the creditor could collect
on the underlying note even when he took a security interest in the
real property, leaving the financially troubled debtor in an even more
precarious position.
Although the creditor is confined to one remedy, the scope of this
remedy is expanded under the one action rule to provide the creditor
with more comprehensive relief than was previously available at
common law. At common law, the creditor was required to file sepa-
rate actions when seeking a deficiency judgment. Under California's
one action rule, the creditor may have both a foreclosure and a defi-
ciency judgment in the same action.58
Most significantly, the one action rule impacts the creditor's recov-
ery of a deficiency judgment. Without section 726, a secured creditor
could avoid most of the limitations on deficiency judgments by ob-
taining a judgment on the note, and then foreclosing on the property.
The one action rule bars this result. Instead of trying to recover first
on the note or on personal property, and then foreclosing on the se-
curity, the mortgagee must first foreclose on the secured property
and then recover a deficiency judgment for the difference between
the fair market value sales price and debt obligation.
C. Exceptions to the One Action Rule
The courts have developed exceptions to the one action rule, thus
permitting the creditor to proceed directly on the note in certain cir-
cumstances. Such exceptions include situations where the security
has become valueless through economic decline,59 the property has
been physically destroyed,60 the security has become exhausted as a
result of a sale pursuant to a senior encumbrance, 61 the subject prop-
erty is nonexistent, 62 or the subject property cannot be encumbered
by the debtors. 63 Hence, the exceptions only apply if the property is
57. Id.
58. Felton v. West, 102 Cal. 266, 36 P. 676 (1894); Ould v. Stoddard, 54 Cal.
613 (1880).
59. Barbieri v. Ramelli, 84 Cal. 154, 23 P. 1086 (1890) (Unless the security is
totally lost or otherwise without value, the creditor must exhaust it).
60. Cohen v. Marshall, 197 Cal. 117, 239 P. 1050 (1925).
61. Roseleaf v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873
(1963); Savings Bank v. Central Market Co., 122 Cal. 28, 54 P. 273 (1898); but cf.
Brown v. Jensen, 41 Cal. 2d 193, 259 P.2d 425 (1953).
62. Dyer Law & Collection Co. v. Abbot, 52 Cal. App. 545, 199 P. 340 (1921).
63. Curtin v. Salmon River Hydraulic Gold Mining & Ditch Co., 141 Cal. 308,
74 P. 851 (1903).
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subsequently worthless and proceeding against the security first
would be meaningless. Yet, if the property was originally valueless
and has not changed in value, the creditor is still forced to proceed
against the security first.6 4
D. Waiver of the One Action Rule
Rights under the one action rule may in certain circumstances be
waived. California Civil Code section 29535 expressly invalidates
waivers of the benefits conferred by California Civil Procedure Code
sections 580(a) and 726, if the waivers were agreed upon at the time
of making or renewing a loan secured by a mortgage or deed of trust
on real property.66 Although this statute does not specifically address
other sections of the anti-deficiency rules, this prohibition against
waivers is said to apply to all. Whether the waiver is valid is deter-
mined by when the waiver is made, who made it, and in some cases,
how it is made.67
The courts refuse to allow the borrower to waive his mortgage
rights at the time of making his loan because the courts view a ne-
cessitous borrower as willing to waive all of his rights in order to
obtain a loan.68 However, waivers subsequent to default are
permitted. 9
E. The Affirmative Defense and Sanction Aspects
of the One Action Rule
Under the one action rule, the debtor has two ways to challenge
the creditor who fails to foreclose on the secured property. Section
726 may be raised as an affirmative defense"0 or as a sanction.7
1
When the debtor raises section 726 as an affirmative defense in a
judicial foreclosure action, the creditor is forced to foreclose on all of
the security first.72 This, however, does not preclude the creditor
64. Kendall, Effect of the One Action Rule on Real Property Security Interests,
44 L.A. B. BULL. 116, 119 (1969).
65. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2953 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988).
66. Riesenfeld, California Legislation Curbing Deficiency Judgments, 48 CALIF.
L. REV. 705, 721 (1960).
67. R. BERNHARDT, supra note 32, § 4.63, at 191.
68. See Salter v. Ulrich, 22 Cal. 2d 263, 267, 138 P.2d 7, 9 (1943).
69. Id. at 267, 138 P.2d at 9 (Since necessity often drives debtors to make ruin-
ous concessions when a loan is needed, section 726 should be applied to protect them and
prevent a waiver in advance. This reasoning, however, does not apply after the loan is
made, when all rights have been established and there remains only the enforcement of
those rights).
70. Id. at 263, 138 P.2d at 7.
71. See Walker v. Community Bank, 10 Cal. 3d 729, 735-36, 518 P.2d 329, 333,
111 Cal. Rptr. 897, 901 (1974).
72. See Salter, 22 Cal. 2d at 263, 138 P.2d at 7; Barbieri v. Ramelli, 84 Cal. 154,
23 P. 1086 (1890). See also In re Kristad, 758 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1985).
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from obtaining a deficiency judgment following the sale.73
If the debtor does not raise the statute as an affirmative defense,
the debtor may still invoke the statute as a sanction. The debtor
raises the sanction effect on the basis that by not foreclosing on the
security in the action to enforce the debt, the creditor has elected the
remedy, thus waiving the security. 4
This sanction effect is based on the policies evident in the lan-
guage of the statute. These rationales include the avoidance of suc-
cessive actions arising out of the same transaction as well as an elec-
tion of remedies for the creditor. 75 A creditor is deemed to have
made an election at the time he obtains a judgment on the note be-
cause he chose to recover a personal judgment instead of resorting to
the security for satisfaction of the debt.7 6 However, some commenta-
tors argue that it is more accurate to say the debtor makes the elec-
tion because the debtor can choose whether or not to raise section
726 as an affirmative defense. 7
The effect of both the affirmative defense and sanction aspects are
devastating to the creditor's interests if the debt is secured by more
than one item of collateral and the lender does not include the entire
security in the one foreclosure action allowed by section 726. The
affirmative defense aspect of section 726 would preclude an attempt
to collect the balance of the debt without exhausting the security;
the sanction aspect prevents the lender from relying on additional
security after the foreclosure decree. 8
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF AN ACTION
UNDER THE ONE ACTION RULE
The California courts have consistently construed the one action
rule as requiring the exhaustion of any real property security prior to
permitting personal recovery from the debtor's unsecured assets.
This expansive construction of the one action rule may carry out the
73. Mertens, supra note 10, at 554, n.2. But cf. J. HETLAND, CALIFORNIA REAL
ESTATE SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 6.18, at 257-58 (1970) (cited in Walker, 10 Cal. 3d
at 733, n.2, 518 P.2d at 331-32, n.2, III Cal. Rptr. at 899-900, n.2 (Professor Hetland
said the creditor is not entitled to a deficiency)).
74. Walker, 10 Cal. 3d at 734, 518 P.2d at 331, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 899; Ould v.
Stoddard, 54 Cal. 613, 614 (1880).
75. Leipziger, Deficiency Judgments in California: The Supreme Court Tries
Again, 22 UCLA L. REV. 753, 788 (1975).
76. See, e.g., Salter, 22 Cal. 2d at 263, 138 P.2d at 7.
77. Leipziger, supra note 75, at 788.
78. Id. at 789.
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intended purpose of section 726, but many times produces unjust re-
sults for the creditor.79 This problem may be partially attributed to
the fact that no precise definition of an action is ascertainable. Thus,
the courts look to the policies 0 behind section 726 and find for the
debtor. However, the policies behind the one action rule do not pro-
mote inequitable treatment for the creditor. California Civil Proce-
dure Code section 22 should be read into section 726. This would
give the courts guidance in applying section 726 and achieving the
rule's purposes. The language of section 22 suggests that judicial
proceedings constitute actions. However, courts have interpreted an
action for purposes of section 726 to include some non-judicial activ-
ity and exclude some judicial activity.
A. Non-Judicial Activity not an Action
for Purposes of Section 726
In Hatch v. Security First National Bank,8' the debtors asserted
that section 726 was triggered by a non-judicial foreclosure. Accord-
ingly, the trial court held that the creditor waived his right to ex-
haust the additional security. The California Supreme Court re-
versed the trial court's decision, stating that successive piecemeal
extrajudicial foreclosure sales in multiple security cases are
allowed.82
B. Non-Judicial Activity as an Action
for Purposes of Section 726
Although Hatch equates judicial activity with action for purposes
of section 726, other cases view non-judicial endeavors as constitut-
ing an action under the one action rule. 3 The California Supreme
Court in McKean v. German-American Savings Bank,8 4 held that
the one action rule barred the creditor from effecting a setoff to a
debt secured by a mortgage. The court recognized that the underly-
ing setoff8 5 was not an action in the classical sense. However, under
79. See, e.g., Bank of America v. Daily, 152 Cal. App. 3d 767, 199 Cal. Rptr.
557 (1984).
80. See supra note 56-57 and accompanying text.
81. 19 Cal. 2d 254, 120 P.2d 869 (1942).
82. Id. at 258, 120 P.2d, at 872.
83. McKean v. German-American Savings Bank, 118 Cal. 334, 50 P. 656 (1897);
Gnarni v. Swiss-American Savings Bank, 162 Cal. 181, 121 P. 726 (1912); Woodruff v.
California Republic Bank, 75 Cal. App. 3d 108, 141 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1977); Daily, 151
Cal. App. 3d at 767, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 557 (In McKean, Gnarni & Woodruff, the setoffs
were filed judicially. The conduct (setoff) was considered nonjudicial even though judicial
proceedings were undertaken). See Arnold, supra note 7, at 10.
84. 118 Cal. 334, 50 P. 656 (1897).
85. The exercise of a bank's right to apply its depositor's funds to the payment of
a debt (the underlying note in the mortgage transaction) owed by the depositor. See
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section 726 the mortgaged premises constituted the primary fund out
of which the debt must be paid. Thus, the security had to be ex-
hausted first."6
In Gnarni v. Swiss-American Savings Bank,87 the California Su-
preme Court relied on McKean and held that the one action rule
barred a setoff because it required that all security be exhausted
before a personal action may be instigated against the debtor or
property of the debtor, such as the bank account. In Gnarni, the
court did not explicitly term this conduct an action for purposes of
section 726. However, the court determined that the setoff ran
counter to the one action rule.88 Thus, the court imposed the sanc-
tion aspect, precluding the bank from foreclosing on the secured
property.89 The Gnarni decision was affirmed in Woodruff v. Califor-
nia Republic Bank,90 which held that a setoff of a bank account
against a debt secured by a deed of trust on real property was pre-
cluded by the one action rule.91
More recently, Bank of America v. Daily,9" held that a setoff con-
stituted an action within the meaning of the one action rule.93 Com-
mentators contend that Daily promotes the policy of section 726, but
the court's rationale raises questions as to whether the correct deci-
Annotation, Post-Sniadach Status of a Banker's Right to Setoff Bank's Claim Against
Depositor's Funds, 65 A.L.R. 3d 1284 (1975); see, e.g., Daily, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 767,
199 Cal. Rptr. at 557, where debtor was also a bank depositor. When debtor defaulted
on the note, bank setoff (applied the funds of the checking account toward the payment
of the defaulted note) approximately $10,000 from debtor's checking account and then
attempted to foreclose on the property secured by the deed of trust.
86. McKean 118 Cal. at 339-40, 50 P. at 659.
87. 162 Cal. 181, 121 P. 726 (1912).
88. Id. at 184, 121 P. at 728.
89. Id.
90. 75 Cal. App. 3d 108, 141 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1977).
91. Id.
92. 151 Cal. App. 3d 767, 199 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1984).
93. In 1966, Daily owed the Bank of America $340,000 evidenced by a note se-
cured by common stock. The stock declined in value and the bank subsequently re-
quested that Daily provide additional collateral. Daily then gave a deed of trust on his
interest in real property as security and subsequently defaulted on the note. The bank
initiated several proceedings to collect the balance due on the note. First, the bank sold
the pledged stock at a private sale. Secondly, the bank setoff $10,412.50 from a checking
account that Daily had with the bank. Finally, the bank undertook judicial foreclosure
proceedings on the deed of trust. Daily opposed the foreclosure sale by contending that
the bank already had its one action under section 726 by setting off funds from the
checking account and that by virtue of the sanction, the bank effectively waived the
balance of its security. The appellate court, reversing the trial court, held that a setoff
constituted an "action" under sectiron 726. Further, the court imposed the "sanction"
aspect of section 726 stating that the Bank waived its right to a foreclosure proceeding
because the bank already had its "action" by the setoff.
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sion was reached.9' The court in Daily held that a non-judicial exer-
cise of a setoff is an action for purposes of section 726. But a setoff is
not an action in any traditional sense, because it invovles neither
court proceeding nor judicial decree.95 Moreover, Daily creates con-
fusion in other areas of the law. For example, if a setoff is deter-
mined to be an actioni, it is logical that a nonjudicial sale be consid-
ered an action also. Under Hatch v. Security First National Bank,"°
a creditor may non-judicially foreclose on several parcels he or she
holds as security. Both the non-judicial foreclosure sale and the set-
off are not actions in any traditional sense. If courts hold setoffs as
actions, this could logically lead to a reversal of Hatch, which held
that a non-judicial foreclosure sale was not an action. 7
The sanctions which Daily imposed are even more troubling than
the characterization of the setoff as an qction. Because section 726
requires a secured creditor to foreclose first, Daily reached the cor-
rect result insofar as it prohibited foreclosure after setoff. 8 However,
the remedy of prohibiting foreclosure or the right to the unpaid bal-
ance is unjust punishment to the creditor. 9 Although the court rec-
ognized that the fairest sanction would be to require the bank to
refund the money with interest, the court rejected this sanction and
instead imposed a loss of security sanction. This sanction was unduly
harsh.100 Other commentators suggest that such a sanction grants an
unwarranted windfall to the debtor which section 726 does not con-
template, and goes beyond promoting the public policies of section
726.101 If section 726 is to have any validity in this situation, the
debtor should be given the right to force the creditor to foreclose on
the security. The debtor must have the right to raise the one action
rule as an affirmative defense. This problem is complicated even fur-
ther when the creditor's loan is secured by both real and personal
property. 1°2
If the setoff in Daily was not viewed as an action, the creditor
would have been able to setoff the amount owed in the checking ac-
94. See Arnold, supra note 7, at 11; Mitchell, Setoff Imperils Foreclosure, 102
BANKING L. J. 60 (1985); Rowan & Mertens, Bank of America v. Daily: Setoff Versus
the Right to Foreclose 8 REAL PROP. L. REP. 73 (1985); Mertens, supra note 10, at 555-
56.
95. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
96. 19 Cal. 2d 254, 120 P.2d 869 (1942).
97. Rowan & Mertens, supra note 94, at 76.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 78.
100. Id. at 77.
101. Id.
102. Enterprise Leasing Corporation v. Epstein, 189 Cal. App. 3d 834, 234 Cal.
Rptr. 676 reh'g denied & nonpub. (May 14, 1987); Walker v. Community Bank, 10 Cal.
3d 729, 518 P.2d 329, 111 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1974). (The amendments of Cal. Com. Code
§ 9501(4) will affect the application of the one action rule in a mixed collateral context).
See generally Hetland & Hansen, supra note 37, at 199-215.
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count and subsequently foreclose on the security. Thus, the creditor
would have been able to recover the entire amount by foreclosing on
the property interest securing the debt. However, the creditor would
not have been permitted to recover under the setoff, because the
bank account was not taken as security. °3 Instead, the setoff would
be returned to the debtor with interest, and the creditor would be
forced to first foreclose on the security.1
0 4
C. Judicial Proceedings which are not Actions
In In re Rivers'0 5 a creditor held a note secured by two pieces of
real property. The debtor filed for protection under the Bankruptcy
Act, 0 6 while the creditor sought relief from the stay to foreclose on
both properties. The trial court granted leave to foreclose on one of
the properties and the creditor proceeded to do so without a judicial
proceeding. When the creditor returned to court to foreclose on the
second property, the court determined that the creditor had taken his
one action against the debtor by filing the original petition for relief.
Because the creditor did not pursue the hearing before seeking fore-
closure on the second property, the creditor violated the one action
rule and thereby waived the balance of his security. 10 7 The federal
district court reversed the bankruptcy court and determined there
was no action for two reasons: (1) there was no judicial foreclosure;
and (2) the creditor was not seeking a deficiency judgment. 08 Rivers
stresses the importance of recovery of a debt in a judicial proceeding
before an action can exist.' 0 9
Passanisi v. Merit McBride Realtors, Inc.110 also focused on the
issue of what type of judicial conduct by the creditor constitutes an
action for purposes of section 726. The court of appeal in Passanisi
held that a judgment for attorney's fees awarded to a trust deed ben-
103. Arguably, the bank would have a security interest in any account where it
acts as lender.
104. See infra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
105. 39 Bankr. 608 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 55 Bankr. 699 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1984).
106. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1987).
107. 39 Bankr. 608 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984).
108. 55 Bankr. 699 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984).
109. "In retrospect, it appears that the Bankruptcy Court must have viewed the
motion for relief from stay as somehow transforming the non-judicial trustee's sale which
followed into judicial foreclosure, thereby activating the deficiency procedure of Section
726." This notion is wrong and does not promote any of the goals of Section 726. See
Arnold, supra note 7, at 11-12.
110. 190 Cal. App. 3d 1496, 236 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1987).
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eficiary who successfully blocked the trustor's efforts to enjoin a trus-
tee's sale was not an action under section 726.111
In Rivers, the creditor did not recover under his motion for relief.
In Passanisi, there was a recovery in a judicial proceeding for fees.
If the court found either proceeding to be an action, there would
have been no recovery on the debt. Although facially these proceed-
ings fit within the definition of a judicial proceeding,' 12 since there is
no recovery on the debt, finding an action cannot be jusitified." 3
V. SOLUTIONS
A. Implementation of the Uniform Land Transactions Act
There is a need to clarify what an action is for purposes of section
726. Some commentators suggest that the one action rule be rejected
by implementing the Uniform Land Transactions Act ("ULTA")."
4
The ULTA expressly rejects the one action rule by providing the
creditor with two sets of rights, one under the note and one under
the security agreement."' The ULTA was proposed in 1975 and ap-
proved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. It has received little support in individual states. ULTA
is structured to parallel Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial
Code,1 6 which governs secured transactions. Section 3501 of ULTA
specifically addresses foreclosures. According to this section, a se-
cured creditor can proceed under the note or foreclose on the secur-
ity. It further provides that if the creditor sues on the note before
foreclosing, the judgment lien may relate back to take a priority po-
sition over the security interest. ' 7 Under ULTA, deficiency judg-
I 1l. Id. The trustor in this case initially obtained a preliminary injunction halting
the trustee's sale. The beneficiary prevailed at trial. He sought recovery for the
$15,473.50 in attorney's fees pursuant to a provision within the deed of trust obligating
the trustor to pay attorney's fees incurred by the lender. However, the trial court didn't
award the full amount of attorney's fees requested. The plaintiffs, on appeal, argued that
the lender's judgment for attorney's fees was an "action" for purposes of Section 726.
The court reasoned that the determination of attorney's fees was not an "action," be-
cause the one "action" rule only applied when the creditor beneficiary had brought an
action against the debtor to recover a debt or enforce some debt secured by a deed of
trust. Since the underlying "action" (enjoining the exercise of power of sale) was initi-
ated by the trustor, section 726 was inapplicable.
112. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 22 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988). See supra note 10
and accompanying text.
113. Since the amount of fees recoverable in most settings will be but a small
fraction of the overall debt, it seems unlikely that the court would hold that recovery of
fees constitutes an "action".
114. Leipziger, supra note 75, at 758; Bruce, Mortgage Law Reform Under the
Uniform Land Transactions Act (as amended), 65 GEo. L. J. 1245 (1976).
115. Bruce, supra note 114, at 1279.
116. Comment, Secured Transactions Under Article 3 of the Uniform Land
Transactions Act, 3 Wis. L. REV. 899 (1976).
117. Bruce, supra note 114. (The relation back will only occur if the judgment
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ments are significantly altered in two ways. First, a debtor is liable
for any deficiency remaining after the sale of the collateral. Second,
a creditor may not obtain a deficiency judgment against a protected
party on an obligation secured by a purchase money mortgage."1
8
Although ULTA achieves uniformity among secured transactions
in different states, it violates the policy of protecting the debtor
which is the impetus behind section 726. By providing the creditor
two separate rights, one on the note and one on the secured property,
the creditor is in an extremely advantageous position while the
debtor is disadvantaged.
B. Legislative Clarification of the One Action Rule
1. Incorporation of California Civil Procedure Code Section 22
into the One Action Rule
The term action of the California Civil Procedure Code section 22
should be incorporated into section 726.119 This section contemplates
the occurence of an action in judicial proceedings only, 120 and if in-
corporated into section 726 it would prevent a holding such as Daily.
The setoff which, in the Daily case, was found to be an "action" is
not a judicial proceeding for the recovery of a debt. 121 Therefore, the
incorporation of California Civil Procedure Code section 22 into Sec-
tion 726 would alleviate some of the mystery as to exactly what con-
stitutes an action.
a. Policy Statement of the One Action Rule
Additionally, a policy statement of section 726 should be added
stating the following: "The legislature declares that it is the express
policy of the state to require a creditor to look to the real property
security first before reaching a debtor's other assets. This section
shall be liberally construed to effectuate this purpose.' 1 22 One com-
specifies that the obligation was secured by real estate identified in the judgment. Id. at
1279 n. 260).
118. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 580(b) provides the same protection; see supra note
33.
119. Mertens, supra note 10, at 577-78.
120. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
121. Id.
122. Mertens, supra note 10, at 578. This provision essentially provides that the
debtor may use section 726 as an affirmative defense to force the creditor to look to the
secured property first. This proposal clarifies the sanction which the court imposes if the
creditor fails to foreclose on all of the security first. Unlike Daily, which held that the
1109
mentator suggests a debtor's remedy section.' 23 This section essen-
tially provides that a creditor who fails to foreclose on all of the
security first may obtain a personal judgment against the debtor but
not recover the security.
This proposal does not promote the security first principle of the
one action rule. The proposal is similar to that of the proposed New
York Civil Procedure Code from which California's section 726 is
derived.12  The proposal does prevent a multiplicity of actions.
125
However, the New York Code provides for an election of remedies
whereas the California section limits both the choice of remedies and
the remedy itself.126 California Civil Procedure Code, as interpreted
by the courts for over one hundred years,127 bars this type of inde-
pendent action upon the note and requires the creditor to look to the
security first. 2 The proposal suggests recovery of the debt instead of
foreclosure on the property if the debtor fails to raise section 726 as
an affirmative defense. This is actually a preferred sanction to the
creditor. There is a need to clarify the meaning of the sanction as-
pect. However, enforcing section 726 as a choice of remedies does
not fulfill the purpose of the security first principle, enabling the
debtor to dispose of the secured property before the creditor can re-
cover on the underlying debt.
A section providing for debtor's remedies is necessary. This section
should expressly provide for sanctions against a creditor who fails to
foreclose on all the security first. The creditor should not be permit-
ted to obtain a personal judgment on the underlying debt. Instead,
the proper sanction should be to refund the amount of money the
creditor obtained (if the procedure of obtaining funds was a setoff),
creditor could neither reach the security nor obtain a personal judgment against the
debtor, this proposed sanction provides that a creditor who fails to foreclose on all the
security first may obtain a personal judgment against the debtor, but may not recover the
security.
123.
The creditor or trustee at the creditor's direction shall sell all the property
which is security for a debt before seeking a deficiency judgment pursuant to
subsection (b). If a creditor does not do so, a debtor may compel the creditor to
foreclose by pleading and proving that the debt was secured by real property.
If the debtor does not compel the creditor to foreclosure on all the security in
the creditor's one action, the creditor may obtain a judgment against the
debtor for the balance due but may not foreclose on the security at a later date.
The security shall be declared free of the mortgage or deed of trust at the
debtor's request.
Id. at 579.
124. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
126. Id.
127. Winklemen v. Sides, 31 Cal. App. 2d 387, 88 P.2d 147 (1939); Porter v.
Muller, 65 Cal. 512, 4 P. 531 (1884).
128. Winklemen, 31 Cal. App. 2d at 387, 88 P.2d at 147.
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and force the creditor to exhaust the security. 129 This is the most
equitable means of achieving the policies behind section 726(a): ex-
haustion of the security first, and the avoidance of a multiplicity of
suits against the debtor. This also enables the debtor to recover on
the debt by foreclosing and obtaining a deficiency judgment as the
one action rule contemplates.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts have interpreted the one action rule expansively to protect
debtors' rights. The question of what is an action for purposes of
section 726 is left unanswered. Courts will likely continue to con-
strue policies to protect the debtor. Debtor protection is not achieved
through inequitable creditor remedies. 130 A solution to this problem
rests in defining and applying the term action. Policy and debtor's
remedies subsections advocating a security first principle are also
necessary to guide the courts in their application of section 726.
This Comment has proposed the incorporation of section 22 into
section 726. Section 22's definition provides that only judicial pro-
ceedings for recovery upon a debt are considered an action for pur-
poses of section 726. This would alleviate the Daily problem in
which the California Supreme Court determined that a setoff (a
non-judicial proceeding) was an action. Further, policy and debtor's
remedies subsections should be added requiring the creditor to look
to the security first, exhausting such security before reaching the
debtor's other assets.
BETH Jo ZEITZER
129. This sanction was raised by the court in Daily, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 772, 199
Cal. Rptr. at 559, but the court refused to implement it.
130. See, e.g., Daily, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 767, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 557. Such inequi-
table creditor remedies ultimately increase the cost of financing real property transac-
tions, harming rather than helping the debtor.
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